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Abstract 
In this paper I present a dynamic structural model of girls' schooling choices and 
estimate it using the Mexican PROGRESA database. This structural approach 
allows evaluating the efectiveness of several policies to increase school reentry 
rates for girls in low-income households. To increase school attendance among 
poor children in developing countries, policy makers have implemented 
conditional cash transfers programs. Although transfers have been successful 
in keeping girls at school, they do not increase school attendance among girls 
who have dropped out of school. Cash transfer programs may fail because 
most of these poor girls leave school to stay at home helping in housework, 
rather than working for a salary. Results suggest that effective policies to 
increase school reentry rates for poor girls are free access to community 
nurseries and kindergartens, and increasingg the availability of secondary 
schools. 
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1 Introduction
In this paper I evaluate the effectiveness of alternative policies to persuade girls who dropped
out of school and belong to poor families to return to school and continue with their education.
I discuss the differential effect that several policies have on reentry decisions and on enrollment
decisions. I quantify the effect of demand-side policies such as conditional cash transfers and
availability of daycare centers for young children. I also present results of the effect of a supply-
side policy on school attendance that is the increase in the number of communities where a
secondary school is available. The analysis is based on a dynamic behavioral model of school
choices for girls. The structural parameters of the model are estimated using the Mexican
PROGRESA database.
The motivation behind this study is threefold. First, in the paper I address a relevant policy
concern: how to increase educational participation in developing countries. Despite the efforts
made by policy makers in increasing enrollment rates, educational participation is far from
targets proposed by several international institutions1. UNESCO (2007) reports that between
2000 and 2006, the total number of out-of-school children in low-income countries decreased by
41%. However, in 2006 almost one in five of children of primary school age was not in school.
Secondary net enrolment rates have been gradually increasing by around 2 to 3 percentage points
per year in most regions. Still, in 2005, three in five children of secondary school age in low-
income countries were not in school. To increase school attendance rates among poor children
in developing countries, policy makers have implemented conditional cash transfers programs2.
Although transfers have been successful in keeping boys and girls at school, there exist evidence
that they do not increase girls’ reentry rates.
Second, in this paper I contribute with the evaluation of a well-known anti-poverty program,
PROGRESA. I quantify the effect of PROGRESA grants on the girls’ reentry decision using
a dynamic behavioral model of school choices. The methodology applied allows performing a
counterfactual analysis. The analysis of the effect of PROGRESA grants on reentry decision
has been seldom discussed. Behrman, Sengupta, and Todd (2001), using difference-in-difference
estimation techniques, conclude that PROGRESA grants increase reentry rates and this effect
is lower for girls than for boys. Valdes (2007) addresses the analysis of the effect of PROGRESA
grants on reentry rates by estimating a reduced form equation for schooling enrollment and finds
that grants increase reentry rates among boys but do not affect girls’ reentry rates.
Third, this study contributes to a growing literature that addresses empirical questions
1For example, universal primary education is Goal 2 of both Education for All movement and the Millennium
Development Goals adopted by UN Member States in 2000
2Examples of cash transfer programs are PROGRESA in Mexico, PRAF in Honduras, Red de Proteccio´n
Social in Nicaragua, and Familias en Accio´n in Colombia.
2
using discrete choice dynamic programming models of individual behavior. These models are
attractive because structural parameters have a clear interpretation within the theoretical model
and they are useful tools for the evaluation of counterfactual policies (Aguirregabiria and Mira
(2007)). Miller (1984) and Keane and Wolpin (1997) propose and estimate dynamic models of
occupational choices. Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago (2005) and Todd and Wolpin (2006) use
dynamic behavioral models to evaluate the PROGRESA program.
In this paper schooling choices for girls in poor families are modeled following the individual
decision approach used by Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago (2005), where boys decide whether
to attend school or to work. For families with many children the value of retaining a girl at
home becomes more relevant because they are a good help in housework. As girls may dropout
from school to stay at home I depart from Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago (2005) by allowing
girls to choose among three alternatives: attend school, stay at home, and work. Under this
framework a girl schooling decision can be assumed to be made by her parents in an altruistic
fashion. That is, they choose the alternative that maximizes their daughter’s inter-temporal
welfare independently of the decision they make for their other children. I relax the assumption
of allowing the value of each alternative to be affected by family composition in two ways.
Unobserved individual heterogeneity and the utility a girl derives from staying at home are
affected by family characteristics.
The estimated model fits girls’ schooling choices reasonably well. It replicates patterns
observed in the actual distribution of schooling choices by ages: for each particular age, reentry
rates are lower than enrollment rates; reentry and enrollment rates decrease as age increases,
and reentry rates decrease faster than enrollment rates. It also replicates main features of the
distribution of schooling choices by stock of education: reentry and enrollment rates decreases as
the stock of education increases and, in the last grade of primary school and in the last grade of
junior secondary school reentry and enrollment rates go down remarkably. It is observed in the
data that most girls who were attending school in the previous academic year (non-dropouts)
were still in school in the next academic year, whereas only 40% of girls who were out of school
(dropouts) came back. The estimated model is able to match these differences in the distribution
of schooling choices between female non-dropouts and dropouts. It rationalizes these differences
by showing that persistence and unobserved ability at school are relevant in the decision to
attend school. The model also contributes to understand the reasons that make a girl dropout
from school. A girl’s decision to drop out of school is related to her age, the composition of her
family, her mother’s labor participation, and also related to unobserved characteristics of the
girl, such as her unobserved ability at school. As her value at home increases with the number
of members in her family and with her age, she leaves school not to work but to stay at home
helping in housework. Additionally, results suggest that alternative policies to cash transfers,
such as free access to community nurseries and kindergartens, and increasing the availability of
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secondary schools, effectively increase school reentry rates for poor girls.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main features of the PROGRESA
program and describes the characteristics of the PROGRESA database. It also provides some
main statistics that focus on the differences between dropouts and non-dropouts. In Section 3,
I present the theoretical model and discuss its empirical implementation. In Section 4, I present
the results of the estimation of the structural parameters, I discuss the validity of the estimated
parameters, and I show the results of the counterfactual analysis. Finally, Section 5 concludes
the paper with its main results.
2 The Data
2.1 Description of PROGRESA
The Education, Health and Nutrition program, PROGRESA, was first implemented by the
Federal Government of Mexico in 1997, with the aim of helping the poorest families in rural
communities. A fundamental characteristic of the program is that aid is conditioned on a
specific behavior of the beneficiary. This conditionality aims to guarantee that the program does
not lead to undesired outcomes, such as distortions in work decisions, and that it successfully
accomplishes its initial objectives.
The program comprises actions in three major areas: education, health, and nutrition. The
expected outcomes were higher literacy rates, enrollment rates, and completion rates; lower
child mortality rates and higher vaccination rates; and lower rates of undernourishment. The
program is targeted at the family level. A family is qualified as being poor and thus eligible
for the program according to a single index. This index contains information on family income
and housing characteristics such as presence of running water, electricity, pipes, etc.3 Eligibility
is independent of residence and family size and composition. All aid is given to the mother as
there is evidence that mothers are better than fathers at allocating family resources4.
The education component includes monthly grants for children of a family qualified as bene-
ficiary. To be given a grant, children need to be less than 18 years old, enrolled in school between
the third year of primary school and the third year of junior secondary school, and to fulfill a
minimum attendance requirement. The grants are not assigned based on academic achievement.
A child who does not pass a grade is still eligible for the grant in the following year. However,
if the child fails the same grade twice, she/he losses eligibility. The grant increases with the
years of schooling completed. In the junior secondary level the grant is slightly higher for girls,
3For a complete analysis of the targeting see Skoufias, Davis, and Behrman (1999a) and Skoufias, Davis, and
Behrman (1999b).
4See Rubalcava and Thomas (2000) for a discussion.
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Table 1: Grant amount and household income and consumption (in Mexican pesos)
Monthly grant July - Dec, 98 Jan - June,99
Primary School
3 70 75
4 80 90
5 105 115
6 135 150
Secondary School
1 girl 195 210boy 185 200
2 girl 220 235boy 195 210
3 girl 240 255boy 205 225
Monthly maximum support by
means of grants per family 420 465
Annual aid for school supplies Academic year 98/99
Primary School 135
Secondary School 170
Monthly Household Income and Consumption Nov 98
Income 1071
Consumption 630
Source: Data on grants from Histo´rico de apoyos monetarios. SEDESOL 2005. Data on income
and consumption from Albarran and Attanasio (2002)
because there is evidence that in poor families girls are more likely to dropout of school and that
they dropout earlier than boys. Additionally, beneficiaries receive an annual grant for school
supplies. In Table 1, there is a description of grants amounts. An eligible family was entitled
to receive at most 420 pesos per month by means of scholarships in the second half of 1998.
This amount represents 40% of the mean monthly family income and 67% of the mean monthly
family expenditure in consumption. Thus, scholarships are potentially an important source of
household resources.
2.2 Evaluation of PROGRESA
Mexican authorities have intended to evaluate the program since its beginning, not only to mea-
sure results and impacts but also to provide information that allow for a redesign of policies.
Accordingly, in 1997 and 1998, a high quality data set was collected in 506 communities where
the program was to be implemented, and several surveys were carried out afterward. In October
1998, the program was implemented in 320 randomly selected communities (treated communi-
ties), whereas in the remaining 186 communities (control communities) the implementation was
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postponed until December 19995. In Figure 1, below, I present the timing of the program.
Figure 1: Timing of the PROGRESA program
There exist a large literature on the evaluation of the average effect of PROGRESA schooling
grants. Authors agree in their main conclusions: the program has increased enrollment rates for
those children who received the grants, and this positive effect is higher on girls and on children
who attend secondary school. Two approaches in this literature can be distinguished according
to the methodology applied. Researchers exploited the random assignment of the program at
a village level and calculated difference and difference-in-difference estimators. Schultz (2004)
is one of the main references. Subsequently, researchers began analyzing ways to improve the
effectiveness of the program by estimating structural dynamic models of discrete choice to sim-
ulate schooling decisions under alternative policies6. Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago (2005)
models schooling as an individual decision and Todd and Wolpin (2006) uses a model of parental
decisions about fertility and child schooling.
2.3 Summary statistics
The sample used for the estimation of the model includes observations for females from 8 to 17
years old from the October 1998 and November 1999 surveys that provide data for the academic
years 98/99 and 99/007. Each wave of the survey includes 9,162 girls belonging to 6,296 families.
To identify school dropouts I use information from the October 1997 survey that was collected
one year before the implementation of the program. In particular, I use the following question:
5The quality of the randomization has been extensively documented in Behrman and Todd (1999), who con-
clude that, at least at community level, the implementation of the random assignment was performed successfully.
6Eckstein and Wolpin (1989), Rust (1994), and Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) are exceptional surveys on the
estimation of structural dynamic models of discrete choice.
7Six and seven years old girls are not included because PROGRESA grants are given to those children who
have completed at least second grade in primary school. Therefore, a children aged seven or less is not entitled
to receive a grant. Additionally, although the entrance in primary school is delayed one or two years, enrollment
rates in first and secibd grade in primary school were above 96% in the 1998 survey.
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Table 2: Distribution of choices in academic year 98/99 for Non-dropouts and Dropouts
Choice Non-dropout Dropout Total
school 7,276 515 7,791
(92.3) (40.1) (85.0)
work 108 94 202
(1.4) (7.3) (2.2)
home 495 674 1,169
(6.3) (52.6) (12.8)
Total 7,879 1,283 9,162
Percentages in parenthesis.
“Is she attending school now?” A girl is considered a “dropout” if the answer is “no”, and a
“non-dropout” if the answer is “yes”. The sample consists of 18,324, 15,758 (86%) non-dropout
and 2,566 (14%) dropout observations.
By the time of the October 1998 survey, 85% of girls were enrolled in school, 2.2% were
working for a salary and 12.8% were neither in school nor working; so I assume they were at
home helping in housework. The distribution of choices is not the same for non-dropouts and
dropouts. As it can be seen in Table 2, most non-dropouts were still at school in 1998, whereas
more than 60% of dropouts did not go back to school and were mainly at home. For both groups
the alternative of working for a salary is negligible.
Differences in the distribution of choices between non-dropouts and dropouts are even more
important when they are analyzed by age and by stock of education, as it is shown in Figures 2
and 38. In both graphs it is evident that girls leave school to stay at home, and not to work for
a salary. Additionally, enrollment rates for non-dropouts are always higher than for dropouts.
Looking at the distribution of choices by ages, enrollment rates decrease with age and the rate
at which they decrease is higher for dropouts.
There are two grades in which enrollment rates for non-dropout girls go down remarkably:
grade 6, when girls finish primary school, and grade 9, when girls finish secondary school. A
similar situation occurs with reentry rates: they are at their minimum levels in grades 6 and 9.
8A complete report of distribution of actual choices can be found in the Appendix in Tables 12 and 13.
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Figure 2: Distribution of choices in academic year 98/99 by age
Figure 3: Distribution of choices in academic year 98/99 by stock of education
The information contained in the PROGRESA surveys refers to individual characteristics,
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family composition, parents’ activities and background, and community characteristics. Descrip-
tive statistics for selected variables in the academic year 98/99 for non-dropout and dropout girls
are presented in Tables 3 and 4.
Table 3: Summary statistics for Non-dropout Girls
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Age 11 (2.2) 8 16
Years of education 4.2 (2.1) 0 10
Potential monthly wage 323.3 (215.3) 29.3 2401.2
Percentage of girls belonging to
a poor family 87 (0.3) 0 1
Number of adults 3.3 (1.5) 0 12
Number of sisters 0.6 (0.8) 0 5
Number of brothers 1.3 (1.1) 0 6
Number of siblings aged 5 or less 1.2 (1.2) 0 11
Percentage of girls whose father
is present at home 93 (0.3) 0 1
Percentage of girls whose mother works 8.9 (0.3) 0 1
Mother’s years of education 2.9 (2.5) 0 18
Percentage of girls that reside
in a village with secondary school 34.7 (0.5) 0 1
Table 4: Summary statistics for Dropout Girls
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Age 13.6 (1.8) 9 16
Years of education 4.9 (2) 0 9
Potential monthly wage 445.1 (217.3) 49.2 1629.9
Percentage of girls belonging to
a poor family 87 (0.3) 0 1
Number of adults 3.6 (1.5) 1 10
Number of sisters 0.6 (0.7) 0 3
Number of brothers 1.3 (1.1) 0 5
Number of siblings aged 5 or less 1.1 (1.2) 0 7
Percentage of girls whose father
is present at home 93 (0.3) 0 1
Percentage of girls whose mother works 9.0 (0.3) 0 1
Mother’s years of education 1.9 (2.1) 0 16
Percentage of girls that reside
in a village with secondary school 21.8 (0.4) 0 1
The mean female non-dropouts is 11 years old and has four years of education completed.
Her mother has completed three years of education. She has one sister and a brother older than
six years, and one sibling aged five years old or less. If she decides to work she can earn 323
pesos, an amount of money higher than the amount of the scholarship. Of the non-dropouts,
87% belong to a poor family, only 8.9% have a working mother, and 7% do not live with their
fathers. Of the non-dropout, 35% have a secondary school in their village of residence.
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The mean female dropout is 14 years old and has five years of education completed. Her
mother has completed two years of education. She has one sister and a brother older than six
years, and one sibling aged less five years old or less. If she decides to work she can earn 445
pesos. Of the dropouts, 87% belong to a poor family, 9% have a working mother and 7% do
not live with their fathers. Of the dropouts, 22% have a secondary school in their village of
residence.
Comparing both groups we can conclude that dropouts have less educated mothers, a higher
proportion of them have to travel to other communities to attend secondary school, and if they
work they receive a higher salary than non-dropouts.
3 Model and Empirical implementation
3.1 The general model
In this section, I present a dynamical behavioral model of schooling decision for girls aged 6
(the official age to enter school) to 17 (the stopping period)9. At each age t, a girl chooses one
of three mutually exclusive actions: work for a salary (ait = w), go to school (ait = e), or stay
at home to help in housework (ait = h). This is consistent with assuming that parents make
decisions in the best interest of each of their children; therefore, there are no interconnections
between the decisions of children that belong to the same family. Let Ωit denote the state vector
that contains all variables known by girl i at age t, which have an impact on her current and
future choices. Among other components, it also includes the girl’s stock of education and the
uncertainty about the evolution of her future stock of education. The probability of passing
the grade at age t for grade g is denoted by pistg, that is, the transition probability for the girl’s
stock of education. At age 18, girls either work and earn wages in accordance to their levels of
education or stay at home.
Period t alternatives are chosen to maximize the intertemporal utility function
E[
T−t∑
j=0
βju(ai,t+j ,Ωi,t+j)|ait,Ωit] + βT−t+1E[V T+1(ΩT+1)|ait,Ωit], (1)
subject to the evolution of future values of the state variables, particularly to the probability of
passing a grade pistg. β is the intertemporal discount factor, V
T+1() is the terminal value function,
Et is the expectation operator conditional on the state, and u(ait,Ωit) is the instantaneous utility
function at age t for individual i that is specific for each choice a. By Bellman’s principle of
optimality, the choice specific value functions can be obtained using the recursive expression:
9The reason for choosing 17 as the stopping age is that in the database, all the women aged 18 and above
report that they are not enrolled in formal education.
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v(a,Ωit) ≡ u(a,Ωit) + βE[max
a∈A
v(a,Ωi,t+1)|ait,Ωit], (2)
for a = w, e, h and t ≤ T − 1, and v(a,Ωit) = u(a,Ωit) + βE[V T+1(ΩT+1)|ait,Ωit] for a = w, e, h
and t = T . The optimal decision rule is then:
α(Ωit) = arg max
a∈A
v(a,Ωit). (3)
In the database there is information on the individual’s action ait and a set of the individual’s
characteristics Xit. From an econometric point of view, the state vector includes two subset of
state variables: Ωit = (Xit, it, µi). Xit are observed variables, and it, a random time variant
shock, and µi, a random time invariant variable, are unobserved variables.
3.2 Utilities
The per-period utility function of working is:
u(w,Ωit) = ηwit + wit, (4)
where wit is the potential wage a girl can earn10.
The per-period utility function of attending school is:
u(e,Ωit) = µi + α1ηGit + α2ηGit ∗Di + α3Di + α4ASit + α5Sit + α′6xeit + eit, (5)
where µi is the unobserved type, individual specific and time-constant. Git is the potential grant
amount, that takes a positive value if the child belongs to a poor family, resides in a treated
community, and is attending a grade between third year of primary school and third year of
junior secondary school. Di is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the child has dropped out
of school in the previous academic year11. ASit is a dummy equal to 1 if there is a junior
secondary school in the community where the girl resides (is a measure of the direct cost of
attending secondary school). Sit is the girl’s stock of education. xeit is a set of individual and
family characteristics that includes a dummy variable equal one if the child is behind in school, a
dummy variable equal one if the child has graduated from primary school and a dummy variable
to reflect the effect of graduation from secondary school, and mother’s schooling.
The per-period utility function of staying at home is:
10Because it is reported only in a small percentage of the cases in the survey, it is estimated by ordinary least
squares (OLS). For more details see the Appendix.
11The dropout dummy is constructed using information on school attendance from the September 1997 survey.
It is based on the same question used to construct the alternative chosen by the girl in 1998 and 1999.
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u(h,Ωit) = δ0 + δ1C5it + δ2SIit + δ3Bit + δ4MWi + δ′5x
h
it + 
h
it, (6)
where C5it is the number of siblings aged five years old or less. SIit is the number of sisters
aged from 12 to 16, and Bit is the number of brothers from six to 18 years old. MWi is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the mother works for a salary. xhit is a set of individual and family
characteristics that includes the age of the child, a dummy equal one if the girl’s father lives
with his family, and an indicator of the socioeconomic situation of the family.
3.3 Assumptions
On random shocks: ait for a = w, e, h is a random variable that affects the utility of action a
in period t for individual i. It is observed by the individual but not by the econometrician.
The ait’s satisfy the conditional independence assumption, that is, they are independent across
choices, individuals and periods with distribution F(.).
On utilities: u(ait,Ωit), the utility functions, are additively separable in observables and
unobservables:
u(ait,Ωit) = u˜(a,Xit) + ait (7)
Thus, the optimal decision rule becomes
α(Xit, it) = arg max
a∈A
v(a,Xit) + ait (8)
And, for any (a,X) ∈ A× X, the conditional choice probability is:
Pr(a|X) =
∫
1[v(a,Xit) + ait > v(a
′
, Xit) + a
′
it ∀a
′
]dF(it) (9)
On unobserved heterogeneity: Following Heckman and Singer (1984) there are M types of
individuals, for M a finite set of types. µm is the parameter related to type m and pim is the
proportion of the population of that type12. Girls are heterogeneous in their ability at school.
Each girl knows her own type but it is not observed by the econometrician.
On transition probabilities: pistg, the transition probability of the stock of education, is exoge-
nous and does not depend on effort or on the willingness to continue schooling. It varies with the
grade and the age of the individual and it is known to the individual13. The age of the girl, the
12Types probabilities are estimated using a logit model and depend on family composition variables.
13It is also different between those girls that receive PROGRESA grants and those who do not receive the aid,
because the grant could be an incentive to perform better at school.
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amount of the grant, and the amount of the salaries evolve deterministically14. The availability
of secondary schools remain constant since the academic year 1999/2000. The girls’ mothers
stock of education is constant. To control for the socioeconomic situation of the family I use
the poor family indicator reported in PROGRESA surveys. This indicator does not vary across
time. Girls expect that the composition of her family will not change after 1999. Work status
for the girl’s mother is assumed time-invariant and identified with her work status reported in
1999. If her father does not live with his family I assume that he is not present at home from
1999 onwards. The number of sisters, brothers, and siblings aged five years old or less evolve
with the age of the siblings and I assume that there are no newborn children through all periods.
On individual decision approach: I assume that each girl is a single decision unit. The model
presented so far is valid if it is the girl or her altruistic parents who chose the girl’s action
that maximize her lifetime welfare. It may be difficult to accept that a parent that decides to
keep a girl at home is doing an altruistic decision for her/his daughter. This assumption is more
reliable if we remember that most of girls aged 18 years old and older have their own families and
they are housewife. Their parents may consider that by keeping them at home when they are
young they are accumulating housewife skills. In the present model interrelationship of schooling
decisions across siblings is not directly considered. The individual decision assumption is relaxed
in two ways. First, by allowing the girl’s utility of staying at home to vary with several family
composition variables. Second, the unobserved type, that enters the utility of attending school, is
affected by the number of adults and children in the family and by the girl’s birth order. It can be
argued that parents make schooling decisions for all their children simultaneously. Particularly,
the decision of whether or not to send a daughter to school is affected by the number, ages,
gender, and action chosen for the other children in the family. In the model, to choose the
action for a girl, parents take into account the number of children they have, their ages, and
their genders; parents also consider whether the mother is working outside the household and
the total number of adults in the family. The assumption that the decision of one girl in a
family does not depend on the decision of other girls in the family may be strong, because,
as seen in Table 7 in the Appendix, there is a positive correlation between a girl’s decision of
attending school and the proportion of sisters that do attend school even after controlling for
family composition variables. For girls attending secondary school, the proportion of sisters
attending the same level of education only matters, whereas for girls in primary school there is a
positive correlation with the proportion of sisters attending both levels of education. Assuming
that a girl’s participation in primary school does not depend on her brothers choices seems more
14The evolution of the amount of the grant from 1998 to 2007 is observed and reported in Oportunidades (2008).
The evolution of salaries in the period 1998-2007 is constructed using observed salaries in 1998 and updating them
with the annual increase in the minimum wage for Mexico reported in CONASAMI (2008).
13
plausible because there is no correlation between girls’ participation in primary school and the
proportion of brothers attending school, whereas there is evidence of correlation between girls’
participation in secondary school and the proportion of brothers attending secondary school.
3.4 Identification discussion
There are two concerns about the identification of the parameters in the proposed model: state
dependence in the utility of attending school and identification of the effect of PROGRESA
grants.
State dependence and unobserved heterogeneity: I introduce state dependence in the model
in two ways. First, by allowing the utility of attending school to depend on the dropout indicator
Di. Second, state dependence is also present through the stock of education observed in the year
before the implementation of the PROGRESA program, Si,97, that affects the utility of attending
school in 1998. Since we do not know the complete story of schooling decisions before September
1997, having Si,97 in the utility of attending school imposes an initial condition problem. Both
variables Di and Si,97 are correlated with the unobserved type µi. This correlation is explicitly
introduced in the model by making the type probability a function of both Sit and Di. The type
probability function is:
pim = Pr(µi = µ|Si,97, Di, Zi,97) = Φ(ζ0 + ζ1Si,97 + ζ2Di + ζ ′3Zi,97), (10)
where Zi,97 is a set of individual, and family characteristics that includes the birth order of the
child, the number of adults and children at home in 1997, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
mother works for a salary in 1997, and a dummy equal to 1 if the girl’s father lives with his
family in 1997. Notice, that although the estimated parameters in the type probability function
are highly significant the identification of the unobserved heterogeneity using a panel with only
two waves of data in a model that includes state dependence is tenuous and relies strongly on
functional forms.
Grant effect: The effect of the grant in the utility of attending school is modeled as a
proportion of the impact of the wage in the utility of working. The model can then reflect a
different effect given by one peso received as a grant or one peso received as a salary on the
decision of attending school. For the identification of both effects it is necessary to have two
different sources of exogenous variation. Wages vary with the girls’ age, their stock of education,
and a set of labor market variables of their village of residence. The amount of the grant also
varies with the girls’ age and their stock of education, and, most importantly, it has an exogenous
(random) variation between girls who reside in treatment and control communities.
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3.5 Likelihood
Define θa = {η, α1, ..., α6, δ0, ..., δ′5, λ} as the set of parameters in utilities and in the terminal
value, and θm = {ζ0, ..., ζ ′3} as the set of parameters in the type probability function. Let
ρ = {θa, θm, {µm}Mm=1, β, pistg}, the set that includes all the parameters to be estimated in the
model and the transition probability of the stock of education. Suppose u˜(a,Xit), V T+1() and
F() are known up to ρ. A girl’s contribution to the likelihood is:
li(ρ) =
M∑
m
∏
k
∑
a
1(aik = a)× Pr(aik = a|Xit, Sit, Di, µm, θa, pistg, β)× Pr(µm = µ|Zi,97, Di, Si,97),
(11)
where m = 1, ...,M indexes the types of individuals, k = 1998, 1999 indexes the waves of the
survey, a = w, e, h indexes the three choices, and t = 8, ..., 17 indexes the age of the girl. The
sample log-likelihood is then L(ρ) =
∑
i ln li(ρ).
To evaluate the li for a particular value of ρ it is necessary to know the optimal decision
rules α(Xit, it, ρ). Therefore, for each trial value of ρ the value functions v(a,Ωit) have to be
computed. The expression for the value functions at subsequent ages is computed recursively
starting from age 18 and working backwards until the current age t. Under the assumption that
the unobserved state variables ait are drawn from an extreme value distribution, conditional
choice probabilities and recursive value functions in Eq. 2 have convenient (logistic) closed
forms15. The model is estimated by a combination of maximum likelihood for θa, θm, {µm}Mm=1,
and a grid search for the discount factor β.
4 Results
4.1 Parameter estimates
Maximum likelihood estimates of the model’s structural parameters are reported in Tables 8,
and 9 in the Appendix. The probabilities of passing grade s at age t, pistg, used in the estimation
of the model are reported in Tables 10 and 11 in the Appendix.
The estimated parameters in the three instantaneous utilities have the expected signs and
the most relevant parameters for the policy analysis pursued in this paper are statistically
significant. The utility of attending school is higher for more educated girls, who have more
educated mothers, and living in communities where there is a secondary school. Salaries have a
positive effect on the utility of working. The utility of staying at home is higher for older girls,
15See the Appendix for the explicit functional form of value functions, conditional choice probabilities and
Emax function.
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belonging to a family with at least one children aged five years old or less. This utility is lower
if the girl’s mother works outside the household.
The estimation of the model has been done so far with two types of individuals, that are
well identified. The high type individuals have a higher utility of attending school with an
estimated unobserved effect equal to 3.1. The corresponding estimated value for low types is
0.1. The probability of being of high type is higher for younger girls in the family, a girl that
do not drop out from school in 1997, whose father lives with her family, and belongs to a
family with a lesser number of adults and children. The estimated coefficient of Di is highly
significant, that is, the model relates the types with the dropout status. The probability of being
high type is 75% for non-dropouts and 24% for dropouts. As it can be seen in Table 5 below,
unobserved heterogeneity does contribute to explain differences in the decision of attending
school between non-dropouts and dropouts. High type girls, both non-dropout and dropout,
have a high probability of attending school. In particular, a high type non-dropout has 96.6%
probability of attending school, and the probability of being high type for non-dropouts is 75% .
Low type non-dropouts and dropouts have different order of preferences. Low type non-dropouts
chose first to attend school, second to stay at home, and third to work for a salary, whereas low
type dropouts chose first to stay at home, second to attend school, and third to work. Moreover,
low type dropouts have a probability of staying at home of 58.2%, and the probability of being
low type for dropouts is 76%.
Table 5: Distribution of choices: Non-dropout and Dropout by type (%)
Type 1: High Type Type 2: Low Type
Choice Non-Dropout Dropout Non-Dropout Dropout
School 96.6 89.9 68.8 29.3
Work 0.7 1.4 8.7 12.5
Home 2.7 8.6 22.6 58.2
4.2 Model Validity
The validity of the structural parameters estimates relies strongly on the functional form as-
sumptions made on utilities, the value function, and the type probability. Thus, it is crucial to
test the validity of the estimated model. In what follows, I present evidence on the validity of
the estimated parameters.
I compare the distribution of predicted choice probabilities obtained with the estimated
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parameters with the actual choices the individuals in the sample have made16. As seen in Figure
4, the model does quite well in predicting distribution of choices by ages for non-dropouts, and
it fits the distribution of choices of dropouts reasonable well, although it is not as accurate as
in the case of non-dropouts.
Figure 4: Actual and predicted enrollment rates by age (%)
Predicted choice probabilities by years of schooling completed, reported in Figure 5, reflect
the main patterns in the actual distribution of choices: enrollment rates for non-dropouts are
always higher than for dropouts; enrollment rates for both groups decrease as the stock of
education increases; the lowest enrollment rate in primary school appears in the last grade, that
is grade six; and the lowest enrollment rate considering all grades come in the last year of junior
secondary school. Notice that the fit of the model is better for non-dropouts until grade four and
for dropouts from grade five onwards. A complete report of distribution of actual and predicted
choices by stock of education can be found in the Appendix in Tables 12 and 13.
16Predicted conditional choice probabilities are computed following Carro and Mira (2006). The procedure is
explained in the Appendix.
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Figure 5: Actual and predicted enrollment rates by stock of education (%)
Given the evidence presented so far, I do think that the estimated model fits the data
reasonable well, so in what follows I continue with the simulation of enrollment and reentry
rates under the presence of several policies.
4.3 Counterfactual analysis
Although PROGRESA grants do not increase school reentry rates among girls, perhaps other
policies do. In what follows, I analyze the effectiveness of several policies in increasing reentry
rates by means of counterfactual exercises. Results are presented in Table 6 and details on the
policies follow bellow. It is worth to notice that counterfactuals exercises obtained by using the
parameters related with PROGRESA grants are more credible than other exercises. The reason
is that the identification of PROGRESA grants parameters is obtained with the exogenous
variation provided by the random assignment of the scholarships, whereas there is no natural
experiment behind the identification of the other parameters in the model.
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Table 6: Increase in school attendance due to different policies (in %)
Non-dropout Drop-out
Primary Secondary Primary Secondary
Grade 6 Grade 7 Grade 6 Grade 7
and more and more
Baseline enrollment rates 95 73 65 64 19 36
Policy:
PROGRESA grant 1.0 4.8 0.9 0.3 1.0 0.2
Duplicate PROGRESA grant 1.5 6.5 1.3 0.7 2.1 0.4
in secondary
Free access to daycare center 0.3 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.8 0.8
Free access to daycare center + 1.3 5.9 2.0 1.8 2.9 1.1
PROGRESA grant
Availability of secondary school 0.5 2.5 2.2 2.3 4.3 2.5
in almost all villages
Availability of secondary school 1.5 7.0 3.1 2.7 5.5 2.7
in almost all villages + PROGRESA
grant
Sample size 10,262 2,633 1,612 942 1,322 131
Duplicate the amount of PROGRESA grants in secondary school: Enrollment rates in pri-
mary school are near 90%, whereas the figure in secondary school is 67%. A policy intended to
increase school enrollment could at most increase by 10 percentage points enrollment in primary
school but could increase by more than 30 percentage points in secondary school. This fact
makes the implementation of scholarships that give a higher amount of money in secondary
school education attractive. The results show that for non-dropouts the actual amount of the
grant is near to achieve its optimum because increasing the amount of the grant a 100% increases
enrollment rates in only 35%. For dropouts the effect is duplicated but it is still negligible, con-
firming the initial hypothesis that cash transfers, no matter how much money they receive, do
not substantially change their utility of attending school.
Community nurseries/kindergartens: Suppose all the children aged five years old or less in
the family are sent to a (free) daycare center17. Girls will be no longer needed at home to look
after them and may go back to school. In the model, the utility of staying at home is (positively)
17I do not discuss how the daycare center would be financed.
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related with the number of children aged five or less years old in the family. The effect of this
policy on girls’ school enrollment can be approximated by simulating girls’ choices after setting
the number of children aged five or less years old equal to zero. Notice that making the number
of children less than six in the family zero may overestimate the actual effect of having free
access to a daycare center. Not having children below six at home means that the girl will not
have to take care of them throughout the day, although having access to a child care facility will
reduce the need of help in taking care of the youngest children in the family for at most eight
hours. In the case that school hours fully coincide with the time the children can be left in the
daycare center, the upward bias in the estimation will be reduced. The approximate effect of
availability of nurseries on non-dropouts is lower than the effect of PROGRESA grants, whereas
it is higher for dropouts. A combination of both policies has the desired effect, increasing
enrollment in secondary school for non-dropouts by six percentage points and two percentage
points for dropouts.
Availability of secondary school in almost all villages: As it is shown in Tables 3 and 4, only
in 35% of the villages where non-dropouts reside and in 22% of the villages where dropouts
reside there exists a secondary school. Not having a secondary school available in the village
of residence implies transportation and time costs. Both costs decrease the utility of attending
school. If the government establishes a secondary school in at least all villages where the demand
is high enough, a positive effect on school enrollment and reentry rates could be expected. I
simulate girls’ choices by setting the indicator variable of availability of secondary school for girls
who reside in villages where the potential number of secondary school students is higher than
25 equal to one. The result is promising for all groups, non-dropouts and dropouts attending
primary and secondary school. In primary school, the enrollment rate increases 0.5 percentage
points and the reentry rate increases 2.3 percentage points, whereas the figures in secondary
school are 2.5 percentage points increment in the enrollment rate and 4.3 percentage points
increment in the reentry rate.
In the Appendix in Table 14, I report the grant amount necessary to obtain the same effect
as the proposed alternative policies.
5 Conclusions
In this paper I present a dynamic behavioral model of school choices for girls in poor families
and estimate its structural parameters using the Mexican PROGRESA database. The estimated
structural model fits girl’s schooling choices reasonably well. It is able to replicate patterns
observed in the actual distribution of schooling choices, and it also matches differences in the
distribution of schooling choices between girls who attend school and girls who dropped out.
The model explains these differences highlighting the relevance of persistence in the decision of
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attending school and the importance of the girl’s family composition. Results also suggest that
unobserved heterogeneity in the utility derived from attending school does explain differences
the observed differences in the decisions taken by female non-dropouts and dropouts.
The evaluation of PROGRESA grants resulting from the estimated model is consistent with
previous literature. Grants are a good incentive to keep girls at school but the ones that have
dropped out of school do not return. Simulations suggest that cash transfers do not substantially
increase school reentry rates even when the amount of the scholarship is duplicated. As dropouts
are mainly at home helping to take care of the youngest children in the family, the availability of
daycare centers implemented simultaneously with PROGRESA grants is efficient in increasing
both school enrollment and reentry rates. Both targets are also efficiently achieved by reducing
transportation and time costs in secondary school.
The relevance of family characteristics in girls’ schooling choices suggested by the present
model, invites future research. The most natural extension is the study of school reentry decisions
in the context of a family decision model. The estimation of a model of family child schooling
and fertility decisions, similar to the model presented in Todd and Wolpin (2006), allows relaxing
the assumption that there is no newborn children in the girls’ families.
As a further step, it would be interesting to estimate a collective decision model in which
parents make labor and consumption decisions along with schooling decisions for their children.
Such a model would allow the analyses of interrelations between parents’ labor participation
decisions and girls schooling choices in poor families. Results in the present study show that
mothers’ working status affects the girls’ utility of staying at home. It can be expected that a
girl whose mother works in the labor market would be more valuable at home, replacing for her
mothers’ housework. However, worker mothers in the sample have fewer children than mothers
who stay at home. This family characteristic is coherent with the result suggested by the present
model, namely that a girl whose mother works outside the household has a lower utility of staying
at home. A collective decision model in which parents simultaneously decide their labor status
and their children schooling would shed light to the relation between both decisions. In the
framework proposed, it would be possible to analyze the effect of policies intended to increase
children school participation on parents’ labor participation and girls schooling.
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Appendix
Value functions
The value function for choosing to attend school is:
v(e,Xit) = u˜(e,Xit)
+ βpistgE[max
a∈A
{v(a,Xi,t+1) + ait}|Xit, Si,t+1 = Sit + 1, ait = e]
+ β(1− pistg)E[max
a∈A
{v(a,Xi,t+1) + ait}|Xit, Si,t+1 = Sit, ait = e],
for a = w, e, h and t ≤ T − 1. At age t = T ≡ 17 it is:
v(e,XT ) = u˜(s,XT )
+ βpistgV
T+1(XT+1, Si,T+1 = SiT + 1)
+ β(1− pistg)V T+1(XT+1, Si,T+1 = SiT ).
The value function for working (or staying at home) is:
v(w,Xit) = u˜(w,Xit)
+ βE[max
a∈A
{v(a,Xi,t+1) + ait}|Xit, Si,t+1 = Sit, ait = w],
for a = w, e, h and t ≤ T − 1. At age t = T ≡ 17 it is:
v(w,XT ) = u˜(w,XT ) + βV T+1(XT+1, Si,T+1 = SiT ).
I assume that girls do not attend school beyond 18 years old. At this age they receive a
terminal value that depends on their stock of education and on the potential salary they could
earn at the local labor market. The terminal value function is:
V T+1 = λSi,18 + ηrwi,18.
In all cases below, Emax function are as follows:
E[max
a∈A
{v(a,Xi,t+1) + ait}|Xit, Si,t+1, ait] = ln(
∑
a∈A
exp(v(a,Xt+1))) + E,
where E is the Euler constant (0.577215665). This expression is given by the extreme value
distribution and by the conditional independence assumptions on ait.
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Conditional choice probabilities
Assuming the ait are drown from an extreme value distribution and are conditional independent,
the probability of choosing action a at time t is:
Pr(ait = a′|Xit) = exp v(a
′, Xit)∑
a∈A exp v(a,Xit)
Predicted probabilities
Following Carro and Mira (2006), predicted conditional choice probabilities for each girl are
computed as the weighted average of conditional choice probabilities for each unobserved type,
with weights given by the ex post probability that the girl is of each type conditional on her
stock of education and choice in period k=1998,1999.
Piak =
M∑
m
PiamkP(µi|Ai, Si,97, Di)
P(µi|Ai, Si,97, Di) = P(µm, Ai|Si,97, Di)P(Ai|Si,97, Di)
P(µm, Ai|Si,97, Di) = P(Ai|Si,97, Di, µm)P(µm|Si,97, Di)
P(Ai|Si,97, Di, µm) =
99∑
k=98
∑
a
1[aik = a]Piamk
P(Ai|Si,97, Di) =
M∑
m
P(ai|Si,97, Di, µm)P(µm|Si,97, Di),
where Ai = ai,98, ai,99. Piamk and P(µm|Si,97, Di) are obtained from the model given parameter
estimates.
Correlation in school attendance among siblings
Table 7 bellow shows the OLS estimates of the coefficients of the following simple linear model:
yi = β0 + β
′
1Xi,
where yi is equal one if the girl is attending school, and Xi includes the age of the girl (age),
the proportion of sisters aged below 12 attending school (asgypr), the proportion of sisters aged
12 or more years old attending school (asgopr), similar variables for the proportion of brothers
attending school (asbypr and asbopr), a dummy equal one if the girl’s father is living with
her family (f hogar), number of brothers between 6 and 16 years old (boy), number of sisters
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between 6 and 11 years old (girl11), number of sisters between 12 and 16 years old (girl16),
number of sisters between 17 and 18 years old (girl16), number of children aged less than 5
years old (baby), a dummy equal one if the girl’s mother works for a salary (work m), and an
indicator of the socioeconomic status of the girl’s family (poor).
Table 7: Correlation in school attendance among siblings. Output variable: girl is attending
school.
Girls in primary school Girls in secondary school
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
age -0.043∗∗∗ (0.002)
asgypr 0.701∗∗∗ (0.041)
asgopr 0.137∗∗∗ (0.010)
asbypr 0.046 (0.039)
asbopr -0.005 (0.010)
f hogar -0.021 (0.023)
boy -0.002 (0.006)
girl11 0.017∗∗ (0.007)
girl16 -0.012 (0.008)
girl18 0.017∗ (0.010)
baby -0.003 (0.004)
work m -0.008 (0.019)
poor 0.010 (0.018)
Intercept 0.575∗∗∗ (0.061)
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
age -0.041∗∗∗ (0.005)
asgypr 0.007 (0.052)
asgopr 0.959∗∗∗ (0.017)
asbypr 0.014 (0.055)
asbopr 0.038∗∗ (0.016)
f hogar -0.009 (0.037)
boy -0.010 (0.009)
girl11 0.000 (0.013)
girl16 -0.004 (0.011)
girl18 0.068∗∗∗ (0.015)
baby -0.007 (0.006)
work m 0.030 (0.029)
poor 0.021 (0.023)
Intercept 0.576∗∗∗ (0.110)
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Estimation of salaries
The salary for a girl i residing in village l that chooses to work is computed using the OLS
parameters of the following equation:
ln(wil) = γ0 + γ1ln(wl) + γ2Si + γ3agei + γ4distmetrol + γ5distcabl + γ6class sizel + ωil,
where wl is the agricultural wage in community l, distmetrol is the distance (km) from the
community where the girl resides to the nearest metropolitan area, distcabl is the distance (km)
from the community where the girl resides to the main city at her municipality, and class sizel
is a municipality measure of class size.
A sample selection problem arises in the estimation of the previous equation. The resulting
estimated salaries may be not a good approximation of the potential salaries for girls who do
not work and for girls who do work but do not report their salaries. This problem is solved
by adding the assumption that the transitory shocks to potential earnings ωil are not observed
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before the girl make her choice. Moreover, the variance of gilrs’s salaries may be low since they
are expected to work in low skilled homogenous agricultural activities.
Estimation results
Table 8: Estimates of structural parameters: Instantaneous Utilities and terminal value function
Standard
Variable Estimate Error
Schooling utility
stock of education 5.04 1.02
existence of secondary school 0.27 0.05
mother stock of education 2.12 0.21
grade 6 dummy -4.01 0.28
grade 7 to 8 dummy -0.68 0.41
grade 9 dummy -4.83 0.57
grade 10 to 11 dummy -1.18 0.71
repeater -0.47 0.05
grant 14.30 1.09
grant*drop -13.03 1.26
Working utility
wage 2.44 0.60
Staying at home utility
age 6.69 0.53
number of children aged 5 or less 1.58 0.27
number of girls aged 12 to 16 -1.79 0.40
number of boys aged 6 to 16 -0.54 0.40
poor 0.11 0.07
worker mother -0.29 0.09
father present at home 0.14 0.10
constant -2.88 0.35
Terminal value function
school 1.82 5.61
Log-likelihood = -7,238.59, Discount Factor = 0.95
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Table 9: Estimates of structural parameters: Types and Types probabilities
Standard
Estimate Error
Unobserved type effect
Type 1 3.11 0.56
Type 2 0.14 0.55
Variables in types probabilities
stock of education in 1997 -7.39 0.43
drop -1.92 0.13
birth order 2.41 0.67
number of adults -1.84 0.39
number of children -1.41 0.35
working mother 0.14 0.15
father present at home 1.04 0.26
constant 3.55 0.35
Reference category is Type 2
Table 10: Probability of passing grade s at age t for girls who fulfill the conditions required to
receive the grant
Grade (s)
Age (t) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
6 0.81 0.48 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.70 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
7 0.93 0.84 0.87 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.65 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
8 0.89 0.82 0.91 0.88 0.80 1.00 0.61 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
9 1.00 0.74 0.87 0.91 0.87 1.00 0.56 1.00 1.00 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
10 0.93 0.78 0.91 0.88 0.94 0.91 0.00 0.99 0.95 0.79 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
11 0.91 0.73 0.70 0.82 0.89 0.89 0.67 0.95 0.87 0.68 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
12 0.83 0.40 0.85 0.72 0.83 0.88 0.71 0.95 0.78 0.57 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
13 1.00 0.33 0.50 0.65 0.88 0.84 0.56 0.90 0.50 0.46 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
14 1.00 0.25 0.33 0.27 0.73 0.77 0.37 0.80 0.64 0.38 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
15 0.99 0.29 0.00 0.18 0.20 0.61 0.22 0.80 0.71 0.17 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
16 1.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.44 0.19 0.83 0.79 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
17 1.00 0.20 0.03 0.03 0.32 0.47 0.00 0.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 11: Probability of passing grade s at age t for girls who do not fulfill the conditions
required to receive the grant
Grade (s)
Age (t) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
6 0.84 0.51 0.33 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.66 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 0.89 0.85 0.87 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.64 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
8 0.93 0.83 0.92 0.88 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.63 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
9 0.88 0.77 0.83 0.91 0.82 1.00 0.90 1.00 0.00 0.61 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10 1.00 0.77 0.77 0.85 0.95 0.91 0.78 0.99 0.00 0.59 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
11 1.00 0.63 0.79 0.74 0.90 0.92 0.67 0.95 0.12 0.58 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
12 0.83 0.60 0.55 0.61 0.86 0.95 0.60 0.90 0.00 0.56 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
13 1.00 0.50 0.45 0.38 0.82 0.82 0.46 0.91 0.65 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
14 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.36 0.53 0.67 0.14 0.76 0.75 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
15 0.51 0.33 0.00 0.05 0.53 0.42 0.15 0.68 0.77 0.25 0.40 1.00 0.40 0.40 0.40
16 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.07 0.79 0.77 0.07 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
17 0.38 0.72 0.02 0.00 0.28 0.19 0.00 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Fit of the model
Table 12: Actual an predicted choices by stock of education: Non-dropouts (%)
Years of schooling School Work Home
completed Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
0 98.6 97.6 .7 1 .7 1.4
1 96.1 97 .8 1.1 3.1 1.9
2 96.7 97.7 1.1 .8 2.2 1.4
3 97.1 97.5 1.1 .8 1.8 1.7
4 95.9 95.5 1.4 1.3 2.7 3.3
5 93.3 91.6 1.8 2.1 4.8 6.3
6 65.7 77.4 3.9 4.7 30.4 17.9
7 93.4 84.3 2.1 3.1 4.6 12.6
8 90.5 76.4 2.8 3.9 6.8 19.7
9 41.5 47.7 10.5 6.9 48 45.3
10 93.8 91.5 4.2 .9 2.1 7.5
11 88.9 89.1 0 .9 11.1 10
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Table 13: Actual an predicted choices by stock of education: Dropouts (%)
Years of schooling School Work Home
completed Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
0 94.3 88.9 1.1 3 4.6 8.1
1 65.2 77.2 0 4.3 34.8 18.5
2 47.2 59.6 8.5 7 44.3 33.4
3 39.8 57.8 6.2 7.8 54 34.3
4 73.4 68.4 5.7 6.7 20.9 24.8
5 45.5 52.8 6.9 8.9 47.6 38.3
6 20.4 19.6 10.8 12.2 68.8 68.2
7 74.3 67.2 4.7 4.8 21.1 28
8 55.7 56.9 3.3 5.8 41 37.3
9 19.4 15.7 11.9 9 68.7 75.3
10 66.7 71.8 0 2.6 33.3 25.6
Table 14: Increase in school attendance due to different policies: Evaluated in terms of change
in PROGRESA grants (in %)
Non-dropout Drop-out
Primary Secondary Primary Secondary
Policy Grade 6 Grade 7 Grade 6 Grade 7
and more and more
Free access to daycare center grant*6 grant grant*3 grant*6 grant grant*3
1.2 7.3 1.5 1.5 2.3 0.7
grant*6 grant grant*3 grant*6 grant grant*3
1.2 7.3 1.5 1.5 2.3 0.7
Availability of secondary school grant*7 grant grant*8 grant*7 grant grant*8
in almost all villages 1.8 8.2 1.6 2.4 6.1 1.6
grant *2 grant*2 grant*6 grant*2 grant*2 grant*6
2.0 7.8 1.7 1.3 5.1 1.3
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